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Abstract 
This article analyzes from a strategic approach the relationship between South America and 
China, focusing on the current reform process in the largest Asian economy and its possible 
impacts on South American countries. It discusses the many changes that the Chinese economy 
has gone through in recent decades and also its most recent trends, characterized by a new era of 
slower growth, the so-called Chinese "new normal". Based on this perspective, the article studies 
China´s evolving relationship with Latin America, especially South America, and focuses on a 
closer examination of the Sino-Brazilian relationship as a case study to derive proposals for a 
strategic agenda for the coming years. After a brief introduction, the evolution of the economic 
and trade relations between China and South America in the first decade of the XXI century is 
analyzed. Another section discusses the current structural changes that the Chinese economy is 
facing under its reform process and its impacts on South America. The fourth part specifically 
studies the relationship between Brazil and China in the last years, as a case study to better 
understand the growing importance of China for South American countries. Finally, section five 
presents the concluding remarks. 
Keywords: Latin America–China relationship; Brazil-China Relationship; South-South 
cooperation. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 The economic and political rise of the People's Republic of China over the past four 
decades has few parallels in world history. Particularly in the last ten years, from the acceptance 
of China into the WTO, the perception of the commercial importance of China for Latin America 
- especially South America - became increasingly evident. 
 From the changes in relative prices of natural resources and manufactured goods, to the 
presence of significant Chinese investments in strategic sectors, the "China effect" cannot be 
understood as a mere appearance of a new global competitor. The rise of China involves a 
significant change in the globalizing logic that has prevailed since the beginning of the 1990s, 
and the emergence of new "heavy trends" (Castro, 2011) within the global economy. Some 
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countries benefited more than others. For instance, while commodity export countries 
experienced a boom in their exports due to the impact of China´s growth on commodity prices, 
others suffered from the rise of a new competitor in the manufacturing arena. In either case, the 
fundamental fact is that China poses a new test for national economies and companies 
worldwide. The challenge of strategic repositioning. 
 Regarding Latin American Economies, Barbosa (2011) divides the LAC countries into 
three groups according to their relationship with the Chinese economy. The first group is 
comprised of countries that are almost exclusively commodity exporters, such as Bolivia, Chile, 
Ecuador, and Peru. These countries benefit from a growth of the Chinese economy in the sense 
that it pushes the commodities prices up. The second group is formed by countries that have a 
more complicated relationship with the Chinese growth, since they are both commodity and 
manufacturer exporters, Brazil and Argentina, for example. In that sense, while Chinese 
manufactures compete with them in the global arena, the increase in commodity prices also 
brings some benefits for them. Finally, the third group is formed by countries from Central 
America and Mexico that do not have an abundance of exportable commodities to China and 
who face intense competitive pressure from Chinese exports. Hence, the paper focuses its 
analysis on the South American countries (members of groups 1 and 2 mentioned above), the 
ones that the relationship with China intensified in the recent past. Additionally, it presents 
Brazil as a case for study. The country, who is the region´s primary trade partner with China, can 
serve as a model case for the others in South America, especially because of its atypical situation 
of having domestic industries and being abundant in natural resources, which caused the Chinese 
effect on the economy to be twofold. 
 In the case of South America, it is undeniable that the cycle of economic growth that 
started in 2003 – deeply associated with the commodity boom – is related to China´s economic 
transformations. On trade, China surpassed the USA as the most important destination for South 
American exports. LAC exports to China grew, as a whole, to USD112 billion in 2013 (a record 
2.0% of regional GDP (Ray and Gallagher, 2015). Besides, Chinese investment in the region 
ramped up, particularly after 2010. As an example, between 2007 and 2013, US $ 56.5 billion in 
Chinese investments in Brazil were announced, marking a new phase in the bilateral relationship, 
not only focused on trade, but also on direct investments. Chinese investments had a greater 
emphasis on natural resources in 2010, but started to diversify in the following years. Between 
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2011 and 2013, Chinese companies have found new opportunities in the industrial sector, 
especially in the machinery, equipment, electronics and automotive segments, with a 
considerable amount of the new inflows going into the service sector, particularly finance. 
 In this context, it is crucial to think, from a strategic approach, the possibilities to further 
expand the opportunities of having China as a leading economic partner for South America. This 
article aims at contributing with some insights that can help our continent to move in that 
direction. In this sense, it discusses the changes that the Chinese economy went through in recent 
decades. Later, the paper examines the latest trends in this relationship, in which the nations 
seem to be entering a new era of slower growth, the so-called Chinese "new normal". Finally, the 
paper discusses the Chinese evolving relationship with Latin America, especially South America, 
and makes a closer examination of the Sino-Brazilian relationship as a case of study to derive 
proposals for a strategic agenda for the new era. After this brief introduction, section two 
analyzes the evolution of the economic and trade relations between China and South America in 
the first decade of the XXI century. The third segment discusses the current structural changes 
that the Chinese economy is facing under its reform process and its impacts on South America. 
The fourth part specifically studies the relation between Brazil and China in the last years, as a 
case of study to better understand the growing importance of China for South American 
countries. Finally, section five presents the concluding remarks. 
2. The recent evolution of China-Latin America relationship 
 This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first discusses the main changes that 
occurred in the Chinese economy in the recent decades, a period of fast growth and profound 
transformation. The objective is to present an overall picture of the country’s economic 
performance over the last years, highlighting the sustainability of key indicators and the future 
trends for the Chinese economy.  The other sub-section aims to analyze the change in the China-
Latin America economic relationship during the same period, focusing mainly on trade and 
financing. 
2.1 The recent evolution of the Chinese Economy  
 A nation of 1.3 billion people, China holds the largest population in the globe and has 
recently became the world´s largest economy (when measured in PPP terms), which pushes the 
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country to increase its role in the global economy4. After almost three decades since the 
beginning of market-oriented reforms, China has been one of the world’s fastest-growing 
economies, having more than quadrupled its per capita real incomes in the last two decades. To 
understand how the country achieved such remarkable numbers, it is necessary to understand and 
discuss the main characteristics of this evolution.  
 Despite still being one of the fastest growing economies in the world, the Chinese 
economy is experiencing a recent slowdown. Growth rates declined from almost 15% before 
2008 to roughly 7% in the past few years. Is this China’s “new normal” or should the country 
anticipate even slower growth in the coming years?  
 There are many factors behind this trend. First, a reduction in the demand for its exports 
from key markets such as the US and the European Union. Second, China is rebalancing, shifting 
from an investment-led growth model, with emphasis on exports competitiveness, to a model 
where the demand plays a more significant role – even though it cannot be characterized as 
demand-led growth. Third, China is experiencing a common challenge that faces most of the 
developing countries after they achieve a certain development stage, i. e., the so-called “middle-
income trap”5, which will likely pose a significant challenge for China moving forward. Hence, 
this slowdown, combined with the new pattern and dynamic of growth, can represent a 
watershed in the Chinese relationship with Brazil and other South American countries. 
 This sub-section will present and analyze the leading economic indicators of the Chinese 
economy over the last decades and compare it with i) United States of America (USA), ii) 
Eurozone Area (EA) and three developing regions, iii) Europe and Central Asia (ECA), iv) Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and v) Latin America and Caribbean (LAC). This is important to 
understand some key features of the impressive performance of the Chinese economy in the last 
couple of decades. For instance, table 1 shows the GDP growth rate for China and the others 
from 1990 to 2013. During this period, the Chinese economy grew, on average, at 9.9%. It is 
                                                 
4 According to IMF data, in 2014 the Chinese economy surpassed the American economy when the GDP is 
measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) - which enables you to compare how much you can buy for your money 
in different countries. Without the PPP adjustment, the Chinese economy is still the second biggest, behind the 
United States of America. 
5 Experience shows that transitioning from middle-income to high-income status can be more difficult than moving 
up from low to middle income. This could be the case now for China. As argued by Eichengreen et al. (2013) “A 
number of emerging markets have grown rapidly at low income levels but were ultimately unable to move beyond 
middle income status. The troubled global outlook now poses a risk that even dynamic middle income economies 
like China that are unable to adapt may similarly find themselves trapped, as it were”. 
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noteworthy that, even after the beginning of the international financial crisis of 2008, China was 
able to keep a high growth rate. However, the slowdown is clear. The more recent sub-period 
presented an 8.8% growth average in contrast to the 10.6% of the former sub-period. 
Additionally, in 2014, the Chinese economy advanced by 7.4%, the slowest pace in 24 years6. 
Table 1. GDP Growth (averages for the periods) 
 1990-2000 2001-2008 2009-2013 1990-2013 
China 9,8% 10,6% 8,8% 9,9% 
Europe and Central Asia 0,1% 5,5% 2,5% 2,4% 
Euro Area 2,3% 1,8% -0,4% 1,6% 
Latin America and Caribbean 3,0% 3,4% 2,7% 3,0% 
Sub Saharan Africa 1,9% 5,5% 3,8% 3,5% 
United States 3,3% 2,1% 1,2% 2,4% 
Source: Authors ‘elaboration based on World Bank data 
 One of the most distinctive characteristics of the Chinese economic spur in recent 
decades is the country´s investment rate. In particular, countries that have not yet reached high 
levels of per capita income, such as emerging markets, require high levels of investment for 
infrastructure creation that will enable them to insert themselves in the international trade arena 
and enhance productivity. In regards to that, China presents notable results. As table 2 indicates, 
the country showed, on average, a 41.6% investment as a percentage of GDP in the period of 
1990-20013. Additionally, it presented higher numbers in the most recent sub-period of the 
analysis (2009-2013). It is also noteworthy that the Chinese investment displays an upward 
trajectory, with the last sub-period of the sample being its peak (48.5%). Given the economic 
slowdown, this might reflect the exhaustion of the growth model. Since more investment is 
generating less growth, there is an indication that capital productivity is decreasing. 
Table 2. Gross Investment (% of GDP) (average for the periods) 
 1990-2000 2001-2008 2009-2013 1990-2013 
China 38,7% 41,1% 48,5% 41,6% 
Europe and Central Asia 23,5% 22,6% 21,7% 22,8% 
Euro Area 22,6% 22,6% 20,4% 22,1% 
Latin America and Caribbean 19,6% 20,0% 20,8% 20,0% 
Sub Saharan Africa 16,7% 18,0% 20,6% 17,9% 
United States 22,1% 22,4% 18,7% 21,5% 
Source: Authors ‘elaboration based on World Bank data 
 The very high investment rate is possible due to China’s extraordinary internal rate of 
savings. Table 3 shows that, in 2013, China presented a savings rate of 51% of the GDP, while 
all the other regions/countries – with the exception of the EA (22%) – had results below 20%. 
                                                 
6 Data from National Bureau of Statistics of China. Available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ 
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Such outstanding savings rate brings a trade-off for the Chinese families. Household final 
consumption in China is still much below all the other regions/countries of our sample. As a 
percentage of GDP, American families consume, on average, twice as much as the Chinese 
families. 
Table 3. Savings and Household Consumption (2013) (% of GDP) 
  Savings  Household Consumption 
China 51% 34% 
Europe and Central Asia 17% 67% 
Euro Area 22% 56% 
Latin America and Caribbean 18% 65% 
Sub Saharan Africa 19% 67% 
United States 17% 68% 
Source: Authors ‘elaboration based on World Bank data 
 The Chinese government gross debt has remained stable and below 40% over the last 
decades. On the one hand, figure 1 shows that advanced countries, such as the US and the EA, 
experienced a surge in this indicator in recent years, accentuated in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. It is interesting to note, however, that the indicator for China grew from 32% to 
41% during 2008-2014. This indicates that even though the level is not high the growth 
trajectory should be monitored.  
Figure 1. Government gross debt (% of GDP)  
 
Source: Authors ‘elaboration based on IMF data 
 Regarding the external sector, the Chinese performance was also remarkable.  The 
current account balance was positive over the last decades, reaching its peak as 10% of the GDP 
in 2007. After the crisis, even though it remained positive, the surplus diminished considerably, 
mainly due to the rebalancing of the economies that were running huge current account deficits 
before the crisis, such as the US and some Eurozone countries (figure 2). Meanwhile, the US 
displayed a negative result during the whole period, despite a significant improvement after the 
beginning of the crisis. In that sense, China presented a structural current account surplus for the 
analyzed period, although the result shrank in the last few years, suggesting that the “new 
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normal” for China will still be positive, but smaller than the one experienced in the mid-2000s. 
The smaller current account result indicates that the bonanza years, when China achieved a 
double-digit surplus, will not be experienced again because of the lack of big countries prone to 
run large deficits to balance it in a global scale. 
Figure 2. Current account (% of GDP) (1997-2014) 
 
Source: Authors ‘elaboration based on World Bank data 
 The outstanding current account surplus experienced by China in the last decade – 
especially in the 2005-2008 period – resulted in a massive accumulation of international 
reserves. Table 4 lists the top 10 countries by foreign exchange reserves based on the last 
available data. While China (including Hong Kong) holds more than 4 trillion dollars in foreign 
reserves, the other eight countries combined do not achieve this number. This puts China in a 
unique position in the international scenario regarding financing capacity and access to currency 
reserves. In that sense, it should be expected that China would not face, at least in the short or 
medium-term scenarios, a balance of payment crisis. Also, China can increase its participation in 
the international economy by loaning to other emerging markets and by increasing its Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) participation. Lastly, the pool of foreign reserves allows China to pursue 
countercyclical economic policies when an international crisis hits, avoiding the economic 
slowdown through an injection of government spending in the economy. This happened, for 
instance, in the aftermath of the international financial crisis of 2008. 
Table 4 –List of top 10 countries by Foreign Exchange Reserves (last available date)  
Country Foreign Exchange Reserves (Millions of US$) Date 
China 3,771,347 Jun/15 
Japan 1,242,935 Jun/15 
Saudi Arabia 672,106 Jun/15 
Switzerland 600,180 Jun/15 
Republic of China (Taiwan) 426,398 Jun/15 
South Korea 374,749 Jun/15 
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Brazil 368,252 Jul/15 
Russia 368,000 Aug/15 
India 351,920 Aug/15 
Hong Kong 339,899 Jul/15 
Source: Author´s elaboration based on IMF and national Central Banks. 
 Presented the big picture of the Chinese economy and its main characteristics in the last 
decades, we will now discuss the changes in its relationship with Latin America – focusing on 
South America – on the last decade. This way, section 2.2 brings a short analysis of the recent 
China-Latin America relationship in trade and financing, focusing on South America. 
2.2 An analysis of the recent China-Latin America relationship 
 China’s exponential growth changed its relationship with Latin America in many 
spheres, including the economic. The beginning of this process started approximately 
ten years ago. In 2004, the former Chinese President, Hu Jintao, promised investments 
in Latin America over a 10-year period expecting a two-way trade of $100 billion by the 
end of 2010. Surprisingly, much earlier, in 2008, bilateral trade already reached $140 
billion. Last year, the figure surged to $261.6 billion. In the last decade, China has gone 
from being a relatively insignificant economic partner in South America to the number-
one trading partner of some of the largest economies in the region. China is expected to 
overtake the US and become Latin America's largest trade partner by 2030 (Hakim and 
Myers, 2014). 
 The vast majority of exports from Latin America – especially the South American 
commodity-producers countries – to China have been concentrated in three sectors: 
soybeans, metal ores, and oil. Indeed, cooper, iron and soy represent more than 50% of 
total exports. Driven by continued industrialization, China turned to SA in search of 
metal ores, with Brazil becoming China’s third largest iron ore exporter, while Chile and 
Peru now supplying more than 50% of all Chinese copper imports. The reliance on 
commodity-based exporting to China has exacerbated the region´s vulnerability to price 
fluctuations. This lack of diversification is problematic, as copper and iron prices have 
both experienced a double-digit percentage global decline in recent years, while global 
soy prices have also begun to stagnate.  
 Conversely, Chinese exports to SA are growing in both volume and value, which 
is mostly a result of the diversity and relatively high-skilled nature of the exported goods. 
The majority of the Chinese exports to SA are from the manufacturing sector, with a 
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heavy emphasis on electronics and vehicles. Such industries, when compared to raw 
materials, are much less prone to price volatility, thus preserving much of the overall 
value of Chinese exports. In other words, the China/SA relationship follows the 
traditional center-periphery model, with the former exporting commodities and importing 
high-added value products. 
 In fact, in 2013, China purchased 15% of LAC’s agricultural and extractive 
exports, but only 2% of the region’s manufactured exports. This imbalance between 
natural resources from one side and manufactures from the other is one of the main 
reasons for the trade deficit (around 0.5% of the GDP) that the region experienced in 
2013 with China (Ray and Gallagher, 2015). 
2.2.1 Trade between China and South America (2002-2014) 
 LAC exports to China have soared since 2000, but with the end of the commodity boom, 
the pace is changing. For instance, in 2012, the growth stalling to a 7.2% growth rate in real 
dollar terms, compared to an impressive average annual export growth to China at 23% from 
2006 to 2011 (Ray and Gallagher, 2015). However, even though the pace of this transformation 
is diminished, the change that occurred in the last years is very remarkable. To visualize the fast 
change that took place in the region, in the last decade, concerning commercial partners, we will 
compare the Export-Import profiles of the seven biggest SA economies in 2002 and 2014, and 
verify the three top export and import partners for them in each period. Table 5 shows the 
Export-Import profile in 2002. The dominance of the U.S.A. is very clear. The nation is the 
primary export destination of all countries but Argentina. Regarding the imports, the U.S.A is the 
major partner of the LAC countries as well, always appearing in the first or second position. 
China appears only twice and, only in the third place. 
Table 5- South American Countries Export-Import profiles (2002) 
                                                   Exports                                                         Imports 
Country First Second Third First Second Third 
Argentina 
 
Brazil 
(18.2%) 
USA 
(11.5%) 
Chile 
(10.8%) 
Brazil 
(27.7%) 
USA  
(20.5%) 
Germany 
(6.4%) 
Brazil 
 
USA  
(25.1%) 
Germany 
(4.7%) 
Netherlands 
(4.6%) 
USA 
 (22%) 
Argentina 
(9.9%) 
Germany 
(9.8%) 
Chile 
 
USA 
 (19.2%) 
Japan 
(11.2%) 
China  
(7.1%) 
Argentina 
(18.4%) 
USA 
 (16.3%) 
Brazil  
(10%) 
Colombia 
 
USA 
 (42.1%) 
Venezuela 
(8.9%) 
Ecuador  
(6.6%) 
USA  
(32%) 
Venezuela 
(6.3%) 
Mexico (5.4%) 
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Ecuador 
 
USA  
(38%) 
Peru  
(7%) 
Colombia 
(6.6%) 
USA 
(23.11%) 
Colombia 
(13%) 
Brazil  
(6.3%) 
Peru 
 
USA  
(25%) 
U.K.  
(12%) 
China 
 (7.5%) 
USA  
(19.8%) 
Argentina 
(7.2%) 
Brazil  
(6.3%) 
Venezuela 
 
USA 
 (63.9%) 
Colombia 
(3.4%) 
Canada 
 (2.9%) 
USA 
 (30.1%) 
Colombia 
(9%) 
Brazil 
 (6%) 
Source: UNCTAD 
 Table 6 depicts the Export-Import profile in 2014. The changes that happened in only 
twelve years are impressive. The USA hegemony disappears, and China appears in 2014 as a 
major partner in almost all countries. China appears in the top-three imports list for every 
country and is missing in only one in the exports, Ecuador. In four of the countries, China 
surfaces as the leading export destination and leads in imports in three of them, including Brazil. 
Table 6- South American Countries Export-Import profiles (2014)1 
                                                              Exports                                                     Imports 
Country First Second Third First Second Third 
Argentina 
 
Brazil  
(20.3%) 
China  
(6.5%) 
USA 
(5.9%) 
Brazil  
(21.7%) 
China  
(16.4%) 
USA 
 (13.5%) 
Brazil 
 
China  
(18%) 
USA  
(12%) 
Argentina  
(6.3%) 
China 
 (16.3%) 
USA 
 (15.4%) 
Argentina 
(6.2%) 
Chile 
 
China  
(24.5%) 
USA 
 (12.1%) 
Japan 
 (10%) 
China 
 (20.8%) 
USA 
 (19.7%) 
Brazil 
 (7.8%) 
Colombia 
 
USA 
 (26.4%) 
China 
 (10.5%) 
Panama  
(6.6%) 
USA 
 (28.5%) 
China 
 (18.4%) 
Mexico 
 (8.2%) 
Ecuador 
 
USA 
 (43.8%) 
Chile  
(8.9%) 
Peru 
 (6.1%) 
USA 
(28%) 
China 
 (16.7%) 
Colombia 
(7.5%) 
Peru 
 
China 
(18.2%) 
USA 
(16.2%) 
Switzerland 
(6.9%) 
China 
 (21.1%) 
USA  
(20.8%) 
Brazil 
 (4.7%) 
Venezuela 
 
China 
(31.8%) 
India 
(26.3%) 
Singapore 
 (8.5%) 
USA  
(23%) 
China 
 (17%) 
Brazil 
 (10%) 
Source: UNCTAD. Note: Data from 2012 for Venezuela. 
 As discussed before, it is important to note that the majority of the trade between South 
America and China is based on the exportation of natural resources from SA while the region 
imports manufactures from China, generating a structural trade deficit for the continent. 
According to Gallagher and Porzecanski (2010), China competition in manufactures in the last 
decade affected Latin American manufacturers in a significant way. The authors estimated that 
approximately 92% of the region´s manufacturing exports were under the threat of Chinese 
competition. Since the region was not able to compete with the cheap Chinese manufacture 
exports, the fact generated even the worry that the ability of the region to generate long-term 
economic growth would be impacted by the reprimarization of its productive structure due the 
“forced deindustrialization” posed by the Chinese competition.  
2.2.2 China Financing in Latin America (2005-2014)  
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 Chinese financing to Latin America in the period was formed both by loans and 
by direct investments. Regarding FDI, it is interesting to note that the Chinese FDI has 
been used to develop sectors that are heavily linked to growing export demands. The 
South American transportation industry, in particular, has benefited from substantial 
Chinese investments, especially rail networks (Chatterjee, 2014). Colombia, Argentina, 
and Venezuela received massive amounts of Chinese investment in these areas. The 
strategy is clear: China provides loans to foster their productivity in sectors that are of 
their interest. In this way, they can continue to trade and benefit from cheaper and faster 
raw materials due to productivity gains.  
 The Brazilian mining industry is set to receive $5 billion over the next three years, 
and Argentina signed a $4.4 billion agreement, in 2007, to develop two hydroelectric 
dams. Venezuela also agreed to a $6-billion joint investment fund for infrastructure 
projects in addition to a $16-billion investment deal with the CNPC (Chinese National 
Petroleum Corporation) for oil exploration in the Orinoco River. 
 In fact, China’s policy banks have become the largest annual public creditors to 
LAC governments. Chinese finance to the LAC region have risen sharply in the last few 
years, from US $4.8 billion in 2007 to $22.1 billion in 2014. In 2014, for instance, 
Chinese finance to the region was more than finance to the region provided by the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined (Ray and Gallagher, 
2015). 
 Table 7 presents an overview of the Chinese loans in Latin America during the 
period 2005-2014 and divided by country. Venezuela is by far the country that received 
the higher sum in the region, being responsible for almost half of the total amount 
received by the region. In sequence, we have Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador. These 
four countries together received 48 loans out of 76 for the region. 
Table 7- Chinese loans in Latin America per country (2005-2014) 
Country Number of Loans Amount 
Venezuela 16 $56.3B 
Brazil 10 $22B 
Argentina 10 $19B 
Ecuador 12 $10.8B 
Bahamas 3 $2.9B 
Mexico 3 $2.4B 
Peru 4 $2.3B 
Jamaica 8 $1.4B 
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Bolivia 3 $611M 
Costa Rica 2 $401M 
Honduras 1 $298M 
Chile 1 $150M 
Guyana 1 $130M 
Colombia 1 $75M 
Uruguay 1 $10M 
Total 76 $118.7B 
Source: China-Latin America Finance Database 
 Figure 3 presents how Chinese loans for Latin America evolved through the years. After 
the beginning of the 2008 international financial crisis, Chinese loans in Latin America 
skyrocketed. In 2009, they reached $13.6 billion, a 115% increase from 2008. Then, in 2010, the 
amount arrived at $37 billion, an impressive 172% increase from the previous year. However, 
after that, the flow of investments starts to decrease, declining to approximately $16 billion in 
2011 and 2013, while reaching a low record of $3.5 billion in 2012. In 2014, signs of a recovery 
started to appear.  
Figure 3. Chinese loans in Latin America per year (2007-2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from China-Latin America Finance Database 
 For what sectors is China loans going? Table 9 divides the loans by sectors funded. 
Infrastructure is the area that has received the largest amount, while energy and mining appear in 
second and third position, respectively. In addition, the category “other”, which includes many 
different financial arrangements such as government bonds, trade financing, small and medium-
sized business development loans in Uruguay, satellite development in Bolivia, loans by the 
China-Venezuela Joint Financing Fund, and home construction in Venezuela, received eighteen 
loans, totaling $30.1 billion. 
Table 8- Chinese loans in Latin America per type (2005-2014) 
Type Number of Loans Amount 
Infrastructure 31 $49.9B 
Energy 21 $32.9B 
Other* 18 $30.1B 
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Mining 6 $5.8B 
Source: China-Latin America Finance Database 
 What are the primary sources of the Chinese loans to Latin America? Table 9 shows that 
almost half of the loans, representing more than 60% of the total amount, are made through the 
Chinese Development Bank. Also, the Export-Import Bank of China (Ex-Im Bank) is one of the 
primary sources, responsible for approximately 15% of the total amount of loans. Chinese 
commercial banks, PetroChina, Bank of China and others combined represent the rest of the total 
amount. 
Table 9- Chinese Lenders (2005-2014) 
Lender Number of Loans Amount 
Chinese Development Bank 36 $83B 
Other* 22 $33.6B 
Ex-Im Bank 25 $20.9B 
Source: China-Latin America Finance Database 
*Other lenders include the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), the state-owned investment company 
CITIC Group, PetroChina, Sinopec, and Chinese commercial banks ICBC, Bank of China, and China Construction 
Bank. HSBC teamed up with CDB on an infrastructure loan to Chile. Portugal’s BES and the Centro Andino de 
Fomento (CAF) paired with CAF to lend in the region. 
 After examining the recent changes in the relationship between China and SA, 
the next section analyses some characteristics of the Chinese economy that help us 
understand the structural change and economic slowdown that the country is currently 
facing and that is likely to expand in the short-term. 
3. The Chinese Economy Slowdown 
 Section 2.2 presented the main characteristics of the Chinese economy in the recent 
decades. However, the impressive pace of growth that China showed in the recent past will not 
be seen again. This section discusses some of the factors that will contribute to that. It is 
important to note that the slowdown should not seem as surprising. It is natural for countries that 
achieve a middle-income level to diminish its pace of growth. When this occurs, the countries 
face two different futures. The first is to make reforms, change its development strategy and keep 
growing to reach the rich countries’ per capita income, in a traditional catching-up story.  The 
other, and, unfortunately, more frequent is to remain in the “middle-income trap”, a situation 
where the country is not able to continue its process of catching up and remains in a stop-and-go 
growth pattern, stopping its catching up process for years, and even decades. 
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 As presented in section two, China faced its smallest growth rate in the last 24 years, 
7.4%. Additionally, according to IMF data7, China’s growth is expected to be 6.8 percent in 2015 
and to average 6.2 percent per year between 2016 and 2020. Prompted by the slowdown, China 
has been trying to boost domestic consumption to sustain its expansion and to rebalance its 
growth model that, as observed in the last section, is heavily dependent on investment. As Yang 
(2014) notes, this rebalancing has the potential to improve China’s income distribution. The 
investment-led model will be slowly replaced by a more balanced model, in which household 
consumption and domestic demand play greater roles. This translates to a decrease in profits and 
an increase in wages, which will benefit the middle class.  
 Indeed, in recent years, the labor share of national income has been on the rise – a direct 
reflection of the decline in manufacturing and the expansion of services. Moreover, 
manufacturing employment and output, as a share of the total indicator, began to fall in 2013. In 
fact, in the first half of this year, services accounted for more than half of the overall economic 
growth. It is no surprise, then, that China’s current-account surplus has shrunk rapidly (as shown 
in figure 2), from its 2007 peak of more than 10% of GDP to approximately 2% of GDP in 2015 
(Yang, 2014). 
 The rise in the income inequality in China is one of the main challenges for the country. 
According to the official numbers from the National Bureau of Statistics, China's Gini 
coefficient stood at 0.47 in 2012, down from 0.47 in 2011 and from a peak of 0,49 in 2008. 
However, independent researchers find other results. For instance, Xie and Zhou (2014) use 
several newly available surveys, including a large-scale NBS survey and six independent surveys 
conducted by university-affiliated organizations, to estimate China’s Gini coefficients for recent 
years and concludes that from 1980 to 2012, China’s Gini coefficient increased from 0.30 to 
0.55, surpassing the U.S. coefficient of 0.45. Lastly, Gun (2013) estimates that in 2010 China’s 
overall Gini coefficient was 0.61. This is an indicator that China should seek a more balanced 
growth, not only with the functional income distribution (more wage and less profit) but also 
with less income inequality among the workers.  
 Heavily dependent on the external sector, due to the lack of domestic demand, the 
Chinese economy slowdown is related to the decline of the global demand in the wake of the 
                                                 
7The World Economic Outlook (WEO). Database from April 2015. Retrieved from: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/. Accessed on 10/05/2015.  
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2008 financial crisis, which has forced China to adjust its growth model sooner than anticipated. 
As Yang (2014) pointed out, China’s rebalancing is apparent, first, in the export sector. Export 
growth has slowed down from an average of 29% per year during 2001-2008 to less than 10% 
annually, making foreign demand a far less critical engine of growth. The next sub-sections 
discuss two important points to understand the Chinese slowdown: the demographic changes and 
the role of the financial sector. 
3.1 Demographics changes in the Chinese economy 
 One of the factors responsible for the slowdown of the Chinese economy is the aging 
population. There is demographic transformation going on in China. The share of working-age 
people (16-65 years old) in the total population has been declining since its 2010 peak of 72%. 
Moreover, the absolute number of working-age people has been falling since 2012. For instance, 
the population within working age shrank by 2.44 million in 2013. 
 Not only the share of working-age people is declining, but also the pace in which 
population is growing is rapidly diminishing too. Table 10 presents a comparison between the 
population growth rate in China and other selected developing markets. During the period of 
1908-2013, only China and Russia presented a population growth below 1%. Moreover, the 
Chinese pace is quickly diminishing. In the last sub-period, 2000-13, the Chinese population 
grew only 0.53%. 
Table 10. Population growth (averages for the periods) 
Country 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2013 1980-2013 
Nigeria 2.63% 2.51% 2.65% 2.60% 
South Africa 2.47% 2.18% 1.52% 1.99% 
India 2.20% 1.85% 1.43% 1.78% 
Mexico 2.04% 1.93% 1.27% 1.69% 
Indonesia 2.10% 1.60% 1.38% 1.65% 
Turkey 2.12% 1.59% 1.32% 1.64% 
Brazil 2.12% 1.56% 1.08% 1.53% 
China 1.43% 1.13% 0.57% 0.99% 
Russia 0.67% -0.03% -0.18% 0.11% 
Source: Authors ‘elaboration based on World Bank data 
 At the same time, China is undergoing rapid urbanization, with some 200 million people 
having left the agricultural sector, in 2001-2008, to seek urban manufacturing jobs. More 
recently, however, the pace of migration has slowed substantially. However, rural areas still 
retains 35% of China’s total labor force. In development literature, this migration from rural to 
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urban areas is frequently considered one of the main factors that explain the high growth rates of 
developing countries in its early stages of development. 
 As in many developing countries when the transition from rural to urban area starts, 
China’s large pool of surplus rural labor has played a key role in maintaining low inflation and 
supporting China’s extensive growth model. However, the pace experienced in the recent past 
will not be seen again. From 1980 until 2014, the rural population in China dropped from 80% to 
45.5% of the total population8. With less than 60% living in urban areas, the migration process is 
unlikely to be over but it can be said that the most dynamic phase of China’s transformation to an 
urban society is complete. 
 What the end of massive surplus rural labor can represent for China´s economy? As the 
flow of low-paid migrants into Chinese factories slows, workers demand higher pay, affecting 
the real costs. This is a well-known problem among middle-income developing countries and is 
refereed as Lewis Turning Point (LTP). According to the seminal work from Sir Arthur Lewis, 
an economy with excess labor in a low productivity sector (agriculture, in this case), wage 
increases in the most productive sector (industry) are limited by wages in the less productive 
sector, as labor moves from the farms to industry (Lewis, 1954). The productivity gains 
experienced by the most productive sector generates an investment higher than it would be 
expected in a scenario with full employment. However, when the surplus labor is diminished, the 
wages rise faster, catching up with the expected wages in full employment, resulting in falling 
investments and reduced profits. At this point, the economy is said to have crossed the LTP.  
 Does China already crossed the LTP? Das and N´Diaye (2013) estimate that China is 
very close to it and will reach the LTP between 2020 and 2025. Others, as Jan and Wilmaz 
(2010), believe that China has already passed its ‘Lewis Point’ and the main indicator is the fast 
increase in real wages. Namely, if China just crossed the LTP or will do it in the very near future, 
we can expect that this trend will bring deep changes in its productive structure. China will 
evolve from an exporter of manufacturing deflation to an exporter of manufacturing inflation. 
 The small growth rate of the population and the slowdown of the rural-urban migration 
indicate that, for the next decades, the large surplus of rural workers with very low productivity 
is diminishing, making more difficult to increase labor productivity. In this sense, the Chinese 
economy will not achieve the growth rates experienced before the crisis. The global implications 
                                                 
8 World Bank Development Indicators. Data accessed at 10/05/2015  
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of a Chinese economy growing at a moderate pace are enormous, especially for commodities-
exporting countries, because prices are unlikely to increase in the same way with a weaker 
appetite for commodities from China. 
 In addition, there is a shift in production. In 2013, China’s output of services, which 
contributed with 46% to total GDP, finally eclipsed the output of its industry (44%). An 
economy based predominantly on making things for people now gets more out of doing things 
for them. Indeed, China’s fastest-growing sector last year was wholesaling and retailing, which 
expanded at a double-digit rate. In the workshop of the world, growing numbers now work in 
shops. This indicates that the rebalancing between consumption and investment is happening 
slowly, but this might keep occurring in the next years and decades. Due to the slowdown, the 
Chinese government is trying to use the credit channel to give a push to the economy. The next 
section will briefly discuss it. 
3.2 The role of the financial system and credit in the Chinese growth 
 To combat the slowdown of the economy and keep China growing at a high pace, the 
government also relaxed credit conditions. According to a study by the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS), the debt/GDP ratio for China’s nonfinancial corporations was 113% by 
the end of 2012. Standard & Poor’s found out that, a year later, these firms’ total debt amounted 
to $14.2 trillion, eclipsing the $13.1 trillion of outstanding debt in the USA and making China 
the world’s largest issuer of corporate debt. China’s credit-to-GDP ratio had risen by 58% in the 
period of 2009-2013, when banks pumped out a torrent of loans to fund the government’s 
gargantuan stimulus program. In recent years, the government has tried several times to rein in 
debt, only to back down when it became apparent that deleveraging would be painful. 
 The stock of outstanding financing for the private sector grew by approximately 20% in 
2013, according to the central bank’s broad measure (which includes corporate bonds, equity 
issuance and a variety of loans by banks and other lenders), even as nominal GDP grew by only 
9.5%.In 2014, total credit (as a percentage of GDP) in China was around 200%. In June 2014, 
the Chinese central bank cut the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) – the amount of cash banks 
needs to keep in reserve – for banks engaged in lending to agriculture-related businesses and 
small companies in order to make more money available for lending. This was considered a 
necessary step for the country to achieve its annual growth target of 7%. 
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 As credit rises to 200% of GDP and average financing costs nearing 7%, Chinese 
borrowers now need to generate cash-flow growth of 14% to cover their interest payments 
without eroding their profitability or being forced to borrow even more. Credit-to-GDP levels 
were stable in the second half of 2013 at about 190%, but a very bumpy start to this year – the 
country’s first bond default and stress in shadow banks – prompted the government to reverse its 
stance. A series of loosening measures, including a re-lending facility by the central bank that 
some analysts likened to quantitative easing, helped put growth back on track. 
 Although this should be examined more carefully, it does not mean that China will 
necessarily face a debt crisis anytime soon. The aggregate credit-to-GDP ratio covers 
government, corporate and household debt. Even though 200% is at the high end for developing 
nations, it still is below debt levels for more mature economies. For instance, data from 2011 
published by the McKinsey Global Institute (excluding borrowing by financial institutions) 
shows that countries that were faced with crisis in the euro-area had far higher debt-to-GDP 
ratios, from 260% for Greece to more than 400% for Ireland. 
 One of the reasons for this credit spike in China during the last period is the decrease in 
profits experienced by the Chinese economy in face of the slowdown of the global economy after 
the beginning of the international crisis. Nonfinancial corporations will become increasingly 
dependent on domestic and foreign finance as profits become less accessible to use for 
investment. As their leverage ratios increase, so will their risk premiums, causing their 
borrowing costs to rise and to undermine their profitability even further. 
 Although bank loans still account for the majority of credit provided to China’s real 
sector, other channels of credit extension are growing rapidly. Credit extension activities outside 
commercial banks’ balance sheets are referred to as shadow banking. The Shadow Banking 
System (SBS) operates at the margins of the financial regulation and tends to involve to complex 
and thick chains of intermediation. Indeed, Shadow banking is increasingly important in China, 
especially as a source of funding to small and medium-sized enterprises (“SME”s), including 
entrepreneurial start-up companies (Schwarcz, 2013). The rapid growth of the SBS in China 
presents a challenge for the regulators. On this point, it is interesting to note that Mark Carney, 
the governor of the Bank of England, identified the shadow banking in the emerging markets as 
the greatest challenge to the world economy (The Economist 2014: 9). Elliott and Qiao (2015) 
observe that even though the current size of the SBS in China depends on the definition of 
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shadow banking and estimates of important statistics, some estimations in the recent past 
produced figures ranging from about RMB 5 trillion to RMB 46 trillion, or roughly 8 to 80 
percent of the size of China’s GDP. 
 Another point that raises concerns is the Chinese stock market. After experience a robust 
increase in the recent years, the stock market adjusted very sharply in mid-2015. The Chinese 
stock market crash began with the popping of the stock market bubble on 12 June 2015. By 8-9 
July 2015, the Shanghai stock market had fallen 30 percent over three weeks as 1,400 
companies, or more than half of listed companies, filed for a trading halt in an attempt to prevent 
further losses (Duggan, 2015). Hence, after years of enthusiastic individual investors and the 
own government heavily putting money in the stock market – consequently exceeding the rate of 
economic growth and profits of the companies they were investing in –, the market indicated its 
exhaustion. 
 Moreover, external financing is often the trigger for debt repayment trouble. The Lost 
Decade of Latin America in the 1980s was mainly due to the huge devaluation of their currencies 
after developed countries increased their interest rates in response to the second oil shock. In this 
respect, to have debt denominated in domestic or foreign currencies makes a huge difference. 
China´s situation is different. The vast majority of its debt is held domestically. External debt has 
risen sharply, to approximately $1 trillion, but that is still just a little over 10% of GDP, and 
foreign exchange reserves are nearly four-fold higher, providing ample coverage. Furthermore, 
much of the domestic debt comes in the form of loans by state-owned banks to state-owned 
companies. The risk of banks calling in the loans and, in doing so, causing a wave of defaults is 
small. In this way, the government would be forced to rescue companies that might face a 
currency-mismatching problem. However, the probability of a widespread event is limited. 
Lastly, the maturity mismatch risk cannot be neglected. Liquidity problems can pose a challenge 
even for solvent agents. A close monitoring by the Chinese authorities is necessary to keep the 
system less prone to face a sudden liquidity crisis.  
 Hence, a debt increase in the Chinese economy is a double-edged sword. It enables 
companies and households to boost their consumption and investments, but makes them to spend 
more paying interest and repaying their debts in the future and, in the case of the external debt, it 
is also susceptible to currency fluctuations. However, since foreign debt still represents a small 
part of the total debt, and foreign reserves remain at a very high level, the Chinese economy can 
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keep using the credit channel to boost its growth. However, in order to avoid credit crises in the 
future, the growth pace of the credit needs to be drastically reduced.  
 Summing up, there are many indicators that show that the financial system in China can 
pose some difficult threats for the economy. The stock market, the shadow banking system and 
the fast pace of credit growth are some of the issues that should be addressed by the government 
in order to avoid a deep financial crisis that can spur Chinese growth. The necessity of 
adjustments meant a slowdown in the financial sector growth in China that will affect real 
economic growth, bringing down the potential growth of the country in the short and medium 
run. 
4. A case study: the Chinese-Brazil relationship 
4.1 The Recent Development of Sino-Brazilian Relationship 
 The decade that covers the period of 2004 to 2014 inaugurates a time in which the Sino-
Brazilian relationship reached a new phase and bilateral exchanges in political and economic 
fields acquired more relevance. Since the early 2000s, the two countries have gone through 
different stages, considering the direction of their economic growth models. Brazil’s guidelines 
were macroeconomic stability and social gains, stimulating domestic consumption, especially in 
the post-crisis period. China, especially after its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001, experienced the consolidation of its economic reforms, with the expansion of market 
mechanisms in its economy, providing high growth rates – which sometimes exceeded 10% per 
year. It was during these years that China invested significantly in infrastructure and urbanization 
and obtained constant trade surpluses with the world and accumulated a considerable amount of 
foreign reserves. 
 The current Chinese growth model, particularly over the last decade, has created a large 
window of opportunity for Brazil, highlighting a strong complementarity between the two 
economies. Bilateral trade soared from the early years of 2000s, reaching new records, with an 
average growth rate of 30% per year and totaling $ 83.3 billion in 2013. 
Figure 4: Total Trade, Brazil – China, 2000-2014 (US$ million) 
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Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC - Brazil)  
Elaboration: China-Brazil Business Council 
 The high demand for food and natural resources from China provided a surge in Brazilian 
exports of commodities, particularly iron ore, soybeans, meat, oil and pulp. The good trade 
results between the two countries made China the largest trading partner of Brazil since 2009. 
During this period, Brazil – differently from other countries in the region – accumulated a 
significant bilateral trade surplus with China, reaching its peak of $ 11.5 billion in 2011, only 
achieving unfavorable results in 2007 and 2008, years that preceded the international financial 
crisis. 
Figure 5: Brazil's trade balance with China (US $ million) 
 
Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC - Brazil)  
Elaboration: China-Brazil Business Council 
 A significant rise in the presence of Chinese investments in Brazil was also noticeable, 
reflecting in part the Chinese government's strategy of encouraging the process of 
internationalization of its companies, especially from 2007 and onwards. Very limited until the 
beginning of 2000s, Chinese investments now have more relevance on the international scene, 
particularly since 2010, the year that marks the discovery of Brazil by the Chinese business 
community as a potential destination for foreign investment. 
 As a result of this expansion, Chine invested a total amount of USD 56.5 billion in Brazil 
in the period of 2007-2013. This marked a new phase of the bilateral relationship that was, until 
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that moment, focused almost exclusively on trade. Between 2011 and 2013, Chinese companies 
have found new opportunities in the industrial sector, especially in the machinery, equipment, 
electronics and automotive segments, and recent inflows in the service sector, particularly in 
finance. Infrastructure is also one promising area that has already begun to show results. 
Figure 6: Chinese investments in Brazil (2007 - 2013) – (US $ million) 
Source: China – Brazil Business Council 
 In the same period, Brazilian investments were also present in China, although relatively 
timid compared to the incoming of Chinese companies to Brazil. Companies such as Vale, 
Petrobras and Embraco were pioneers in the development of the Asian country. On the other 
hand, there is a new movement of Brazilian investments in China, highlighting the increasing 
diversification of sectors, such as the presence of BRF and Suzano in agribusiness, Weg in the 
machinery arena, and Bank of Brazil, the first Latin America financial institution to open a 
branch in China. 
 Just as the presence of Chinese investments in Brazil and the strength of the commercial 
partnership showed significant strides, political dialogue also intensified between the countries, 
generating greater commitment to the strengthening of diplomatic ties and contributing to the 
solidification of interactions in more comprehensive spheres. 
 In this sense, the Sino-Brazilian Commission for High-Level Coordination and 
Cooperation (COSBAN) was established in 2004 in order to monitor and implement the bilateral 
agenda. Consisting of eleven subcommittees and six working groups dedicated to the primary 
sectors of mutual interest, the High-level Committee is also responsible for monitoring the Joint 
Action Plan 2010-2014, signed in 2010 by Presidents Lula and Hu Jintao. 
 Clearly, in the last decade the strengthening of Sino-Brazilian relations has gained 
amplitude on a global scale, and the rapprochement between the two partners already exceeds the 
bilateral scope. Brazil and China have expanded convergent dialogues in the context of the G-20, 
which reflects the reorientation of the division of world GDP with a noticeable presence of 
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developing countries, as well as in BASIC, which combines the diplomatic clout of Brazil and 
China with India and South Africa in discussions about climate change. It is also in the context 
of the BRICS group that Brazil and China share similar views on the role of emerging 
economies, especially regarding the reform of global governance in the political and economic 
spheres. 
 In general, what has been observed over the last ten years is a greater dynamism in Sino-
Brazilian relations, with qualitative and quantitative changes. In the economic field, there was a 
significant increase in trade and Chinese investments in Brazil. Similarly, in political terms, it 
was noticeable the strengthening of the bilateral dialogue - with the creation of an institutional 
machinery within the context of the COSBAN - as well as political convergence at a global level, 
with both countries represented in the G20 and the BRICS. Particular attention must be placed on 
the significance of the last Chinese commitments to Brazil (2014-2015), regarding finance and 
infrastructure.9 
 
4.1.2 Most recent commercial trends 
 In 2014, the Brazil-China trade flow totaled $ 77.9 billion (Figure 4). The number reflects 
a decrease of 6% over the previous year, even though it represents the second best result of the 
entire series. Exports totaled US $ 40.6 billion, a 12% decline compared to 2013. Imports 
coming from the Asian country totaled $ 37.3 billion, reflecting a slight increase of 0.1%. With 
these results, the trade balance between the two nations finished 2014 with a balance of $ 3.2 
billion in favor of Brazil. 
 The reduction in the value of Brazil's exports to China in 2014 took place mainly because 
of the downward trend in international prices of major commodities exported by the country. 
Therefore, it is possible to observe that soy and iron ore, products that account for 71.2% of 
Brazil’s total exports, grew in an amount of 1% and 5%, respectively. However, despite the 
increase in volume exported, the two products finished the year with declines of 3.1% and 22.8% 
in total value. 
                                                 
9 For more information on that, see Pinto (2015). 
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Figure 7 - Exports from Brazil to China (2002 – 2014) 
 
Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC - Brazil)  
Elaboration: China-Brazil Business Council 
 In general, the pattern of Brazilian exports to the Asian country in 2014 remained the 
same as in previous years, since sales to China are concentrated in soybeans, iron ore and raw 
oil, which together represent 79.8% of total exports. It is worth noting the strong growth trend of 
some products from the agribusiness. There was a sharp increase in the export value of items 
such as unprepared hides and skins (29.1%), poultry (17.7%) and cotton (75.8%). Emphasis 
should also be given to exports of pulp, which increased by 5.7% in value and 14% in the 
volume exported. 
 In 2014, Brazilian exports to China represented 18% of all the country's foreign exports 
(Table 6). There was a slight decrease from the previous year, in which the output of Brazilian 
products to the Asian partner accounted for 19% of these transactions.  
 Even with the recent price drop of Brazil´s main export commodities, Brazilian exports to 
China are still maintaining the strong positive trade balance with China, offsetting the trade 
deficit with other jurisdictions, such as the US and the European Union, markets in which Brazil 
closed 2014 with negatives trade results of US $ 7.9 billion and $ 4.6 billion, respectively.  
Figure 8: Trade balance between Brazil and selected countries in 2014. 
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Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) 
 In 2014, Brazilian imports from China remained concentrated in three main sectors: 
machinery and electrical and mechanical equipment, which together accounted for 48.4% of the 
total amount of such operations. However, it can be observed that purchases of machinery and 
electrical appliances finished the year with a modest increase of only 0.3%, while industrial 
production in the same sectors declined  12.1% in US $. 
5. Concluding remarks: A strategic approach for the future of the South America-China 
relationship 
 In recent years, the relationship between South American countries and China has 
undergone profound changes that led the Asian giant to become a leading economic partner for 
the continent. In this sense, the success of current Chinese transformations and structural reforms 
can further highlight the importance of the Chinese growth for South America, as the ongoing 
changes should open new possibilities for growth and diversification of relations in the coming 
decades. 
 Even though the analysis in this paper focused on the possibilities for South American 
countries given the changes in the Chinese economy, it is important to note that the relationship 
is not one-sided. The mutual interest is apparent and declared. China’s Policy Paper on Latin 
America and the Caribbean, published in November 2008, announced that, “The Chinese 
Government views its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean from a strategic plan and 
seeks to build and develop a comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equality, 
mutual benefit and common development with Latin American and Caribbean countries”10.  
 Current reforms in China, if successful, will also require a new perspective for global 
integration. These changes reflect the results obtained in four decades of rapid growth, which 
made China the second largest economy in the world, and mark the recognition that future 
development should have a distinct dynamics and rely on other engines. Even under its “new 
normal”, with lower growth rates, China´s influence in the global economy is unlikely to 
diminish. First, the country is expected to keep growing more than developed countries – other 
players who contribute a significant share – in global output for the next years. Secondly, by 
being a much bigger economy now, even a slower rate of growth will make a significant impact 
on global output. As an example, in 1994, China had a GDP slightly higher than half trillion 
                                                 
10 “China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean”. Available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm 
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dollars in current USD. Ten years later, it reached 1.94 trillion. A Chinese GDP growth of 10% 
at that time would add USD194 billion to the global economy. However, in 2014, the Chinese 
GDP reached 10.36 trillion American dollars. A more modest growth in 2014, 5% of GDP, for 
example, would add more than half a trillion USD to the global economy. In this sense, the 
Chinese contribution to world output and, consequently, global demand, can be higher even with 
a slower pace of growth than the one experienced in the last two decades. 
 In the case of Brazil, some indications of the particularities of this new China and its 
implications for Sino-Brazilian relations are presented in a recent World Bank study entitled 
"Implications of a changing China: opportunities for Brazil" (World Bank; 2014). Two general 
principles guide the work: the possible scenarios for the Chinese economy and the significant 
changes taking place in terms of rebalancing and structural reforms, and the consequences of 
these changes for Brazil and how the country should position itself to fully enjoy the 
opportunities posed by a new China. These two main analytical principles can be applied to 
understand the future trends in China – South America relations. 
 From a general point of view, the reforms are essential to ensure a new cycle of growth 
and openness in the Asian country. Although growing at a lower rate, China should maintain a 
central role in the recovery of the world economy and increasing global trade. The expansion of 
the already high degree of openness and changes in its production structure will make China an 
even more significant partner for countries such as Brazil, which already have a significant 
economic relationship with the Asian power. 
 In this sense, the rebalancing of the Chinese economy, raising domestic consumption, 
will open new opportunities for South American exports and investments. Rapid urbanization 
will continue to demand natural resources and foster integration between the economies of both 
countries. In addition to the expansion of large cities, the internal migration coming from the 
countryside will cause medium-sized cities to grow and the further advance the integration of 
vast areas of the interior to the most dynamic sectors of the Chinese economy. South America, 
providing that the necessary conditions to explore the changes under way are met, should 
maintain its growing exports trend to the country, and also try to diversify them. 
 In the food sector, it is expected that the emergence of a new Chinese middle class will 
bring gains for agribusiness exports, following not only the increased demand but also the rise of 
the Chinese consumer expectations for quality standards and health food products. The growth of 
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the Chinese population of upper-middle-income highlights the enormous potential of new areas 
in which South American countries can be inserted competitively. Quality items in traditional 
consumer sectors, such as shoes, furniture, clothing and cosmetics, will present opportunities of 
new market niches for Brazil and Argentina, China may be positioned as an important alternative 
to increase exports diversification. Also, one of the areas in which new opportunities can be 
realized is infrastructure.I Investments from Chinese companies can contribute to the 
modernization of the sector in many South American countries. 
 All these possibilities are, nevertheless, in the realm of mere possibilities. It depends on 
South American countries being prepared for the potential benefits that the new Sino-centric 
configuration of the global economy can provide. There is clear evidence that the present context 
is characterized by enormous possibilities and opportunities that are typical of times of crisis and 
paradigms shifts. Creativity and use of windows of opportunity can potentially give rise to new 
scenarios for individual countries in the global capitalistic system. It is up to the countries 
themselves to be pro-active and establish a strategy that considers the windows of opportunities 
and productive niches that are appearing in the new global economic architecture. 
 Summing up, the paper concludes that the Chinese rapid growth of the last decades 
profoundly changed the relationship between this nation and Latin American countries, 
especially commodity exporters, which were mainly located in South America. The new growth 
perspectives for China – slower and more demand driven – can represent a watershed in this 
relationship and it is mandatory that the countries in South America prepare themselves for this 
new phase in order to strengthen the partnership with the Asian giant. A failure to understand 
these changes and reliance on the path-dependence established in the last decade can be harmful. 
However, by starting now a strategic agenda for economic cooperation considering the Chinese 
new growth scenario can reinforce the partnership and advance the perspectives of sustainable 
and fruitful South-South partnership between China and South America. 
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